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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
DEFENDING JUDGES AGAINST UNJUST
CRITICISM
Ronald J. Bacigal*
The effectiveness of the administration of justice depends in a
large measure on public confidence. The reporting of inaccurate or
unjust criticism of judges, courts, or our system of justice by the
news media erodes public confidence and weakens the administra-
tion of justice. It is vital that nonlitigants as well as litigants be-
lieve that the courts, their procedures and decisions are fair and
impartial. ...
Therefore, cooperation of lawyers and bar associations is nec-
essary to successfully meet inaccurate or unjust criticism of judges
and courts.
-American Bar Association1
H AVING set forth the above premise and conclusion, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Subcommittee on Unjust Criticism of the
Bench promulgated a model program for bar associations to follow
when countering inaccurate or unjust criticism of judges. This article
presents no quarrel with the model program but instead seeks to relate
the model to an empirical account of how it might operate in practice.
It must be remembered that the acid test of a theoretical model is not
whether the theory is "true" in a purely academic sense but whether
the model is useful in describing the "real world." 2 In order to test the
-validity of the American Bar Association ("ABA") model, this article
presents a "real world" account of an incident involving a prominent
judge subjected to public attack by government prosecutors, a famous
newspaper columnist and a powerful United States Senator. The efforts
*Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
1. ABA SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNJUST CRITICISM OF THE BENCH AND COURS & COMMUNITY
COMMITTEE JAD LAWYERS CONFERENCE. UNJUST CRITICISM OF JUDGES (1986) [hereinafter UN-
JusT CRICISM].
2. Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUm. L REv 38.92-93 (1985).
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of bar associations to defend the judge disclose the extent to which the
ABA model program can become a successful plan of operation.
INTRODUCTION
When Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. assumed the office of federal
district judge for the Eastern District of Virginia in August of 1967, no
one could foresee the turbulence that would engulf his life on the
bench. Judge Merhige's judicial career prompted one commentator to
cite him as the prototype of the modern activist judge.3 According to
another commentator, Merhige is "an activist who moves cases in and
out of his court like a drillmaster and who, if he is criticized at all, is
faulted for too readily exercising the considerable power of his
judgeship."4
Judge Merhige's form of judicial activism has stirred controversy
and attracted criticism from the very inception of his judicial career.
Two weeks after his appointment to the bench, Merhige was faced with
government efforts to silence militant black leader H. Rap Brown. Soon
thereafter the judge confronted numerous civil rights and antiwar is-
sues, gaining some immediate notoriety as the first federal judge to de-
clare that the conflict in Vietnam was a war within the meaning of the
Constitution. These early cases were merely a prelude to a twenty-year
judicial career replete with landmark and controversial cases that at-
tracted media attention. In his most controversial decision, Merhige
split the United States Supreme Court in a four-to-four vote on the
issue of the judiciary's power to adjust political boundaries in order to
achieve racial integration.5 At the time of the school busing contro-
versy, the judge's guesthouse was burned, his dog was shot, and his
wife and son left the country after numerous death threats. Merhige
himself faced projected impeachment proceedings and threats of a
searching investigation into his background.
Most recently, Judge Merhige stirred considerable controversy
when he presided over one of the major cases of this century, the bank-
ruptcy proceedings of the A.H. Robins Pharmaceutical Company, man-
3. Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 471 & n.28 (citing
Matter of Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Mebrige, J.)).
4. J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS 168 (1983).
5. See Bacigal & Bacigal, A Case Study of the Federal Judiciary's Role in Court-Ordered
Busing: The Professional and Personal Experiences of U.S. District Judge Robert R. Merhlge,
Jr., 3 JL. & POL. 693 (1987).
[Vol. 23:99
DEFENDING JUDGES AGAINST UNJUST CRITICISM
ufacturer of the Dalkon Shield.6 At the initiation of the bankruptcy
proceedings, Merhige faced motions to recuse himself for having volun-
teered his admiration for the founder of the Robins company and for
unfavorable characterizations of plaintiffs' counsel.' At the conclusion
of the Robins bankruptcy proceeding, Merhige was involved in a highly
publicized dispute with claimants' counsel and with the court-appointed
trustees of the Dalkon Shield settlement trust fund. The press head-
lined allegations that "the record is building toward a charge of viola-
tion of judicial ethics," 8 but no publicity was given to the Court of
Appeals' finding that the charges were unfounded and that Judge Mer-
hige had manifested exemplary fairness.9
As can be seen from the above summary, Judge Merhige's stormy
career has given him extensive experience with handling personal and
public criticism. In general, he recommends that judges develop a
"tough skin" and follow the ABA model program's suggestion to sim-
ply ignore criticism."0 He recognizes, however, that extensive public
criticism can undermine the citizenry's confidence in the judiciary.
Faced with unrestricted condemnation by public figures or the media, a
judge is largely defenseless and must trust to the responsibility of the
bar to restore public confidence in the judiciary."1 This article, ex-
cerpted from a forthcoming biography of Judge Merhige, addresses the
most serious attack on his judicial integrity and the response of the bar
in defending the judge against criticism.
THE TRIAL RECORD
Smith W. Bagley, the heir to the R.J. Reynolds tobacco fortune,
was indicted in North Carolina on charges of an illegal stock manipula-
6. See, e.g. R. BACIGAL, THE LihrTs OF LTTIOAON: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY
(1990); Couric, The A.H. Robins Saga, 72 A.B.A. J. 56 (July 1986).
7. See In reBeard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987). In turn, another federal judge referred
to Judge Merhige as an "S.O.B." Lutz, Interview with Robert R. Merhige. Jr., 12 LITIGAION; 10.
12 (Summer 1986).
8. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 8, 1988, § C, at 1, cols. 1-2.
9. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1989).
10. "Generally, it is undesirable for a judge to answer criticism of her or his own actions
appearing in the news media. This policy has developed to insure the dignity of the administration
of justice, to prevent interference with pending litigation, and to reaffirm the commitment to an
independent judiciary, a judiciary dedicated to decisionmaking based on the facts and law as
presented." UNJUST CmTuicis., supra note 1, at 1.
11. The ABA model recommends "that judges should generally not respond to criticism and
that the bar, both state and local, should respond to inaccurate or unjust criticism of judges and
courts." Id. at 2.
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tion scheme. While the case did not attract national attention, it was a
cause c lhbre to many small investors who lost their life savings and
pension funds when Bagley's company declared bankruptcy. These an-
gry investors descended upon the federal courthouse in Greensboro,
North Carolina, during the pretrial stages of the case. The commu-
nity's strong feelings about the situation increased when the federal
judges in Greensboro disqualified themselves from presiding over the
case. Judge Merhige, of Richmond, Virginia, was then assigned to take
charge of the trial. 2
Concern over the local community uproar led Bagley's attorneys to
move for dismissal of the charges or a change of venue because of ex-
cessive adverse publicity. The difficult task of selecting an impartial
jury in Greensboro was rendered moot when the government prosecu-
tors first opposed then joined in the defense request to move the trial to
Richmond. The prosecutors' hesitancy and reversal of position proved
to be a chronic problem during the course of the trial. The prosecution
team was comprised of two attorneys with limited trial experience, as-
sisted by an official from the federal Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion who had never tried a jury case. Counsel's inexperience contrib-
uted to the discord in the courtroom and ultimately led to charges that
Judge Merhige had conducted the trial with an antigovernment bias.
The charges of bias centered around Merhige's overbearing activ-
ism in pushing trial counsel to move the proceedings along rapidly. Al-
though the attorneys initially had projected the Bagley trial to last four
to six weeks, it was concluded within eight days. The judge pressured
the parties to increase the pace of their presentation while openly ex-
pressing impatience with the inexperienced government prosecutors.
When counsel complained that getting straight answers from a witness
was like pulling teeth, the judge retorted, "Why didn't you take up
dentistry, or something?" When counsel volunteered to "think about
it," Judge Merhige backed off slightly: "You are a good lawyer, but it
would have made my life easier." Informed that counsel "wanted to
make it interesting," the judge murmured, "You have managed." 13 At
12. An attorney who participated in one of Judge Merhige's more celebrated cases speculated
as to the reasons for the judge's assignment to so many prominent cases.
He will use his personality and friendship to move you where he wants to have you. I
think that's why he is put in these controversial cases. When they figure there will be a
bunch of rowdy and radical lawyers, they want an ironman like Merhige in the court-
room. He'll throw them in jail if necessary to move the case along.
Interview with Lewis Pitts, private counsel, in Greensboro, N.C. (Sept. 1986).
13. Report of the Special Committee of the Bar Association of the City of Richmond, Re:
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another point in the trial, a prosecutor interrupted testimony with a
tentative: "I think I want to object to that." Judge Merhige was in-
credulous: "You don't know?"'"
Although Judge Merhige is often labeled as an "activist judge,"
every trial judge must make a fundamental decision whether he will
play an aggressive or quiescent role in the trial proceedings. On the one
hand, the exercise of judicial restraint reflects a commitment to al-
lowing the adversary process to bear the entire burden of presenting the
equities of the case. The justification for a more active judicial role,
however, is the fear that distortions arising from the commitments of
the adversaries will produce inequities in the proceedings. By failing to
take action, the judge may become the abetting instrument of
injustice. 5
Whatever a judge's jurisprudential bent regarding judicial re-
straint or activism, the judge's professional experiences before ascend-
ing the bench will also influence his conduct during the trial. As is the
case with many trial-lawyers-turned-judges, Judge Merhige is more
prone to play an animated role in the proceedings. He displays little
patience with incompetent cross-examination and will "take over" the
questioning in order to clear up an ambiguous factual situation. He
admonishes himself, however, that even when he is better qualified than
counsel to try the case, every judge must recognize when it is time to
"shut up."'16
In the Bagley case, at least at times, Judge Merhige appeared to
disregard his own admonition. When the prosecutor asked a witness,
"Did there come a time that you left the hospital?" the judge broke in:
"I was frightened to death that perhaps she was still there.... If you
keep this up you may have me there."'" Throughout the trial, Judge
Merhige employed his quick wit and his acid tongue to goad the attor-
neys, although he subsequently consoled counsel: "Don't feel too badly
[about the hospital question]. I once asked a witness if he would look at
Judge's Conduct of Trial in United States v. Smith W. Bagley et al., app. F at 2 (Dec. 12, 1979)
[hereinafter Richmond Bar Report].
14. Id., app. F at 24.
15. See Breitel, Ethical Problems in the Performance of the Judicial Function, in CONrRt-
ENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHIcS 65 (U. Chicago 1964).
16. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations of the Honorable Judge Merhige are from inter-
views conducted by the author in Richmond, Virginia, throughout 1985-87 [hereinafter "Merhige
Interviews").
17. Richmond Bar Report, supra note 13, app. F at 25.
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the jury and tell them how far the car traveled after it came to rest." 18
While the judge was intemperate in his remarks to the inexperi-
enced prosecutors, he was evenhanded in his brusqueness with all attor-
neys in the case. When a defense counsel spoke while reposing in his
chair, Judge Merhige interrupted: "I can't hear you unless you are on
your feet." The attorney apologized: "A habit from North Carolina. I
am sorry. We are not allowed to stand there; we have to stand here."
Merhige was not forgiving: "It is easy. You coordinate your tongue and
your legs."'19
THE ATTACK UPON THE JUDGE
The chastised lawyers could not openly confront the judge during
the course of the trial, but when the prosecutors were given an opportu-
nity to strike back at Judge Merhige, they took their reprisals with a
vengeance. After the jury acquitted the defendant Bagley of all
charges, the United States Department of Justice demanded an expla-
nation from the prosecutors. (Such explanations are required only when
an acquittal is contrary to the Department's expectations for a success-
ful conviction.) The besieged prosecutors laid all of the blame upon
Judge Merhige in a nine-page letter summarizing the failed
prosecution:
[N]otwithstanding minor factors which may have con-
tributed to the not guilty verdict in the Bagley case, the con-
duct of the trial judge ultimately ensured its outcome. The
anti-government bias was manifested by Judge Merhige in vir-
tually every phase of the trial. This bias was most clearly re-
flected in the court's intemperate comments and outrageous
jury instructions. At times, the courtroom took on a circus-like
atmosphere ...
In overview, the Bagley trial takes on the quality of a "set
up." Individual incidents which at the time had the appear-
ance of mere intemperance laid the foundation for jury in-
structions which had the effect of a direction to the jury to
acquit. Only at the time of jury instructions did certain of the
judge's exclusionary rulings, unsolicited witness cross-exami-
nations and verbal explosions make sense. An appreciation of
the futility of the prosecution once it reached Judge Merhige's
18. Id, app. F at 26.
19. Id., app. F at 23.
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hands can only be achieved by gaining an awareness of certain
pre-trial matters, and most particularly the court's rulings on
motions to dismiss the indictment ...
While the significance of these motions may simply lie in
defense counsel's skilled advocacy, when viewed in light of
later events, they suggest that the defense team recognized an
all too friendly forum at the outset ...
During the trial itself the government was subjected to
numerous on- and off-the-record diatribes by Judge Merhige.
For example, . . . Merhige was provoked to state out of the
jury's presence that the government was on a witch hunt and
prosecution of the case shocked him. The judge's views that
the government had failed after a week of trial to produce a
"scintilla" of evidence as to a conspiracy were repeatedly ar-
ticulated to the jury. ...
Throughout the course of the trial the judge displayed a
more than merely solicitous attitude toward the jury. He per-
sonally served the panel with coffee and donuts on a daily ba-
sis and arranged on at least one occasion for them to lunch at
his private club. The foreman of the jury was quoted in local
tableaux as stating the jury had not wanted to let the judge
down by its verdict. Judge Merhige is a man of great personal
charisma and charm. In this context, the jury stood on the
edge of its seat listening to the "law," when given in the in-
structions. I concluded from my observation of the nodding
heads in the jury box that at the close of all arguments at
least the defendants Bagley and Gilley had been convicted, if
not all five of the defendants; when the jury instructions were
given, these same heads were shaking in near disbelief. ...
The judge's instructions were tantamount to a directed
verdict. Only a thorough reading of these instructions fully
reveals the not guilty bias through their juxtaposition of
phrases, concepts and gratuitous comments. The government
was never given a chance to present its view of the case as at
no time during the trial was the indictment read to the
jury. . ..
The judge took every element of proof, such as the en-
couragement to buy stock and the making and guaranteeing of
loans for stock purchases, and stated these acts were not un-
lawful. Incredibly, he stated that it was not unlawful to com-
1990]
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pel, intimidate or pressure employees to buy stock for the pur-
pose of supporting the price of the stock or to engage in
buying for the purpose of raising the price of the stock. This
was the heart of the case ...
Once Count Two [of the indictment] was effectively
emasculated, the entire case, practically speaking, was
lost. . . .Finally, the judge stated that the jury could not con-
vict the defendants for their mere failure to disclose informa-
tion but that an affirmative false statement was necessary.
These instructions fail to bear the remotest resemblance to the
law .... 20
The prosecutors' damning letter was leaked to the Washington
Post, which ran a feature story on Judge Merhige's "outrageous" legal
behavior during trial. United States Senator Orrin G. Hatch argued on
the floor of Congress that "no prosecutors would make these criticisms
without great consideration and serious reflection." 21 Senator Hatch of-
fered the prosecutors' letter and the Post article for insertion into the
Congressional Record while urging the Justice Department to conduct
a prompt and thorough investigation of Judge Merhige.2 One of
Hatch's aides warned that although the Senate Judiciary Committee
could not take direct action against a federal judge, "it can hold hear-
ings and raise a stink."'23
The next day, Senator Hatch continued his attack from the floor
of Congress. In preparation for possible Senate action, the Senator
placed a chronology of events surrounding the Bagley trial into the
Congressional Record and informed Senate members that Bagley was
one of the early financial and political supporters of a grateful Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter. Senator Hatch alleged that while the Bagley case
was being prepared, one of the government prosecutors was called to
the Carter White House to discuss a possible promotion. The other
prosecutor was allegedly approached by representatives of the R.J.
Reynolds Corporation, who suggested the possibility of a high-paying
corporate position. The Senator insinuated that the Carter administra-
tion had attempted to stall the trial while eventually arranging to have
the case heard before Judge Merhige, whom Hatch described as "the
political prot~g6 of Smith Bagley's first cousin, the late J. Sargeant
20. 125 CONG. REC. 30,751-53 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
21. Id. at 30,751.
22. Id.
23. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 7, 1979, § B, at 1, cols. 5-6.
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Reynolds, former lieutenant governor of Virginia.1 2  Judge Merhige
thus became the unwitting focus of a political battle between the
Carter administration and Senator Hatch.
The attacks upon Judge Merhige mounted when newspaper colum-
nist Jack Anderson detailed the judge's close relations with the Reyn-
olds family.2 5 Anderson erroneously reported that Bagley had arranged
J. Sargeant Reynolds's funeral and had personally selected Judge Mer-
hige as a pallbearer. At the height of the public controversy, Judge
Merhige drew some solace from an appellate judge, who telephoned to
comment: "Welcome to the club. I see Jack Anderson has charged that
you allowed personal considerations to influence your decision mak-
ing."26 Judge Merhige feebly responded, "It's honored company, but
it's not a club I wanted to get into."2 The appellate judge laughingly
observed that the price for a free press28 includes the judiciary's will-
ingness to suffer such attacks.2 9
The Justice Department also called Judge Merhige to apologize
for leaking the prosecutors' letter to the press and to ask if the judge
had any response to the letter. Judge Merhige refused all public com-
ment while privately bemoaning the fact that a judge cannot ethically
defend himself.30 "As a man, I would have relished the opportunity to
refute my accusers," he explains. "But as a judge, any response on my
part might have detracted from the fact that the defendants were found
not guilty by a jury. It would have been unfair to the defendants for me
to say anything which, in light of the existing atmosphere, might have
24. Id.
25. Anderson, Judge Incenses Bagley Prosecutors. Washington Post. Nov. 6. 1979, § B. at 15.
cols. 4-6; Anderson, Judge Had Ties to Defendant Bagley, Washington Post, Nov. 5 1979. § B, at
13, cols. 4-6.
26. Merhige Interviews, supra note 16.
27. Id.
28. The ABA model is accompanied by the following statement of policy: "Implementation of
this plan is selective. To avoid infringing on the freedom of press, this plan is designed to effect a
response to criticism of the judiciary and courts that is serious as well as inaccurate or unjustified
criticism." UNJUST CRITICISM, supra note I, at 1-2.
29. Merhige Interviews, supra note 16.
30. Id.
The risk is apparent that a response by a judge to criticism of her or his own actions may
be perceived by the community as "seir-serving" and/or as a "defensive" position which
fails for lack of credibility. Also, since there invariably is more at stake than an individ-
ual judge's ego or feelings, the bar should recognize the negative reflection on the dignity
of the administration of justice if a judge should make an intemperate or emotional re-
sponse to such criticism.
UNJUST CrIcsM, supra note 1, at 1.
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been interpreted as casting doubt on the defendants' innocence. 3 1
Given Judge Merhige's activist nature and his preference for can-
did debate, it was especially difficult for him to maintain an Olympian
distance from the controversy raging around him. He was deeply hurt
by the attacks upon his integrity, and his close friends remember this
period as the judge's lowest point. They observed that "he took this
much harder than all the criticism over school busing. This one hit him
on a personal level."132
To Judge Merhige, the most disparaging charge was the claim
that the trial took on a "circus-like atmosphere." "Can you imagine my
courtroom being a circus?" he asks. "They made me sound like a real
jackass when they said I was shuffling around personally serving coffee
and donuts to the jury. a33 Ironically, this lack of dignity was attributed
to a man who sometimes muses that the American bar should return to
the English practice of wearing formal wigs in the courtroom.
As matters stood at this point, a one-sided and perhaps politically
motivated attack upon Merhige constituted the only public record of
the events surrounding the Bagley trial. A "complete" picture of the
proceedings would emerge only when the bar launched its own
investigation.
THE BAR'S DEFENSE OF THE JUDGE
As the attacks on Judge Merhige's integrity mounted, his personal
friends could offer only private support, but his legal allies rose to his
defense. Six days after the first public attack upon the judge, 4 the
president of the Richmond Bar Association appointed a committee of
three of the city's most prominent lawyers to try to clear the judge's
name. The Bar Association president dismissed the prosecutors' letter
as a flimsy attempt by "a couple of disgruntled lawyers who lost their
case and are trying to make an excuse. He also noted that Senator
Hatch had never appeared before Judge Merhige and that the Senator
had not read the record of the case that gave rise to the charges. The
31. Merhige Interviews, supra note 16.
32. Interview with Lewis T. Booker, private counsel, Hunton & Williams, in Richmond, Va.
(Aug. 5, 1986).
33. Merhige Interviews, supra note 16.
34. "To be effective, the response must be prompt, but accurate. If at all possible, the response
should be made within 24-48 hours of publication of the criticism or report, especially keeping in
mind the deadline(s) of the news media that reported the original criticism." UNJUST CRITICISl,
supra note 1, at 5.
35. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 9, 1979, § B, at 4, col. 6.
[Vol, 23:99
DEFENDING JUDGES AGAINST UNJUST CRITICISM
Richmond Bar Association president explained that he felt compelled
to establish the committee because "the judge cannot properly respond
and therefore stands defenseless to such unwarranted attacks. 30
When the investigatory committee convened, it gave Judge Mer-
hige a strong endorsement even before beginning its investigation. "We
have not always agreed with his decisions," announced the three com-
mittee members, who frequently appeared in Judge Merhige's court,
"but we have never seen the slightest suggestion of judicial impropriety
or personal favoritism toward any litigant."37 The blue-ribbon commit-
tee then took prompt action to clear the judge's name. Within a month
of its formation, the committee returned a 133-page report that rebut-
ted each allegation raised by the prosecution. The report was considera-
bly more extensive than that of other groups that normally investigate
judges' behavior, such as judicial disciplinary panels, or appellate
courts. Mindful of their confessed "profound respect for Judge Mer-
hige,"38 the committee members sought to avoid claims of favoritism
by compiling a sentence-by-sentence examination of the accusations,
along with excerpts from the trial transcript. When announcing its
findings, the committee encouraged all concerned citizens to read the
factual report and draw their own conclusions.39
The committee's report divided the prosecutors' charges into six
categories, the first of which addressed allegations that "the courtroom
took on a circus-like atmosphere" and that the prosecutors were sub-
jected to "a maniacal trial schedule." 40 The committee rebutted the
former allegation by noting Judge Merhige's insistence upon proper
courtroom decorum at all times. The judge's law clerk was interviewed
36. Id., § B, at 1, col. 7, at 4, col. 5.
Because of the resiraints placed on judges both by tradition and by the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and the ethical obligations imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility
for lawyers, it is recommended that our state and local bar associations adopt a policy
and program to provide appropriate responses to inaccurate or unjust criticism of judges
and courts.
UNJUST CRITICISM, supra note 1, at 2.
37. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 9, 1979, § B, at I, col. 7. The ABA model suggests that
a typical response to media criticism of the judiciary include the following language: "We may
frequently disagree with the decisions and actions of public officials, including judges, and the
federal and state constitutions protect our right to express that disagreement." UNJUST CRITICISM,.
supra note 1, at 5.
38. Richmond Bar Report, supra note 13, at 2.
39. "The designee or committee chairperson should promptly investigate the underlying facts.
discussing them to the extent possible with other committee members and the judge involved, and
then promptly prepare and release the response." UNJUST CRITItsM. supra note 1, at 3.
40. 125 CONG. REc. 30,751-53 (1979).
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and confirmed that the court's strict rules of protocol were followed and
that the trial was conducted in an orderly fashion.
The committee regarded the allegedly maniacal trial schedule as a
manifestation of Judge Merhige's industriousness, a quality which was
known to all lawyers in advance. The judge had opened the trial pro-
ceedings by advising counsel: "Well, start at 9:30 on the first day.
Then, gentlemen, plan early days, you know. We will try to put in a ten
or twelve-hour day. It won't take us any six weeks to try this case. ' '41
When counsel raised questions about the courtroom hours required to
handle 63 witnesses and 615 documents of some 1,800 pages, the fol-
lowing exchange occurred:
The Court: We are going to work 10 hours a day
minimum ...
Counsel: Will we work on Saturdays?
The Court: We certainly will.
Counsel: And Sundays?
The Court: Right after mass ... 42
The second category of charges of judicial impropriety related to
allegations that the judge gave improper instructions on the law to the
jury. However, the committee report found that several of these in-
structions had been given at the request of the prosecutors. In other
instances, the prosecutors were said to have "distorted" the instructions
in their complaint to the Justice Department.
The third and fourth categories of charges consisted of accusations
that Judge Merhige made erroneous legal rulings during the trial. The
committee of knowledgeable trial attorneys concluded that the rulings
were proper and that it was the prosecutors, not the court, who appar-
ently misunderstood the legal issue involved. It was noted that even the
raw numbers supported Judge Merhige's impartiality. The bar commit-
tee found that 161 miscellaneous defense objections were overruled,
while 140 were sustained. For the prosecution, 14 objections were over-
ruled, while 7 were upheld.43
Another focus of the bar committee report related to claims that
Judge Merhige made the prosecutors look inept with his "intemperate"
comments critical of the government's case. The record revealed, how-
ever, that the judge's most critical remarks were delivered out of the
41. Richmond Bar Report, supra note 13, app. B at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id., app. E at 18.
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hearing of the jury. Judge Merhige's caustic comments were also bal-
anced by attempts to assist the inexperienced prosecutors. At one point
in the trial proceedings, a prosecutor became visibly distressed about
the problems of calling witnesses out of sequence. The judge offered
reassurance:
The Court: You take it easy now. Be cool and calm.
Counsel: I will try, your honor. I am doing my best.
The Court: I know you are. You are doing very well.
After the same attorney again apologized for problems with the order
of witnesses, Judge Merhige volunteered, "I have days like that. I know
your problem. I used to practice law."45
When the jury was present in the courtroom, the judge's participa-
tion in the case consisted of questioning the witnesses, a clearly permis-
sible practice for federal judges.' 6 The committee report did concede
that "it would be accurate to characterize Judge Merhige as an active,
rather than a passive, participant in a trial. The extent to which he
injects himself into witness examination, however, depends on the law-
yer's skill in extracting the witness' testimony. . . .When it became
necessary, . . . Judge Merhige asked questions of the witnesses in or-
der to clarify and expedite the testimony.' 7
The final category of charges concerned allegations that the judge
was "too close" to the jury. The claim that Judge Merhige personally
served the jury coffee and donuts was dismissed as a pure fabrication.
While the judge arranged to have food and drink available to the jury,
at no time did the judge serve as a waiter. His general solicitude to-
ward juries was seen by the bar committee as an admirable quality and
a reflection of "his firm belief that justice is best served when jurors are
comfortable and alert."' 8 The prosecutors' final charge against Judge
Merhige was the type of attack that most people would welcome. The
prosecution alleged that "Judge Merhige is a man of great personal
charisma and charm. . . . [T]he jury stood on the edge of its seat lis-
tening to [his instructions]." Not surprisingly, the bar committee ob-
served that "[i]t is difficult to see how anyone could allege that this
fact prejudices any party to a case. If a jury is attentive as a result,
44. Id., app. F at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id., app. F at 46.
47. Id.
48. Id., app. G at 1.
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surely this is in the interest of justice."4 9
After addressing the allegations line by line, the committee offered
its overall assessment of the judge's trial performance:
[W]e have reached the unanimous conclusion that Judge
Merhige handled the case in a fair and even-handed manner
throughout. He showed no bias against the Government and in
many instances went beyond his normal function to assist the
prosecutors. . . .Indeed, our review of the entire record per-
suades us that this trial was as fair and as error-free as it is
humanly possible to make a trial.
The short of the matter is that Judge Merhige, in our
view, tried this case with exceptional fairness and
correctnessY'
The committee's unqualified defense of Judge Merhige did not sat-
isfy Senator Hatch. He called for a continuing congressional investiga-
tion while questioning both the impartiality of the committee and the
limited scope of its inquiry. The Senator insisted that "it would be ex-
tremely difficult to get an objective report from any committee of law-
yers that must practice before Judge Merhige's court."' 1 Senator
Hatch pointed to one member of the bar committee who worked for the
law firm that previously represented Bagley's investment company. The
committee member in turn denied any conflict of interest but conceded
that such an accusation was not unexpected. "'And it was for that very
reason,' " he explained, " 'that we didn't summarize the transcript [of
the trial] or our conclusions' in the 133-page report. 'We laid out the
transcript for anyone to see and draw their [sic] own conclusions.' "2
Senator Hatch, however, refused to budge from his call for a con-
gressional investigation: "Even if this Richmond Bar Association Com-
mittee report is completely proper and circumspect, it should not be
permitted to stand as the final word."''1 A Senate aide explained that
Senator Hatch's interest in the matter was rooted in his days in private
practice in Utah, when the Senator encountered a federal judge notori-
ous for his undisciplined administration of justice. Because of that ex-
perience, Senator Hatch had become a self-appointed critic of federal
49. Id., app. G at 5.
50. Id., app. G at 4-5.
51. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 21, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 8, at 8, col. 1.
52. Id., § A, at 8, col. 3. "The response should be a concise, accurate, 'to the point' statement,
devoid of emotional, inflammatory or subjective language." UNJUST CRITICISM, supra note I, at 5.
53. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 21, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 8, at 8, col. 4.
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judges, particularly those whose conduct on the bench appears ques-
tionable." The Senator justified his insistence on further investigation
by revealing that he had received information from various sources
both supporting and detracting from the original allegations. He main-
tained that his "concern in this entire matter is the American public's
perception that the federal courts are once again involved in questiona-
ble activity, ' 55 and he vowed to continue the fight until all doubt was
removed.
Senator Hatch never publicly rescinded any of his statements re-
garding Judge Merhige, but the matter was quietly dropped after a
face-to-face meeting between Senator Hatch, the bar committee, and
Virginia Senators Harry F. Byrd, Jr. and John W. Warner. At the
meeting, the committee's defense of Judge Merhige was supported by
Senator Warner, who had studied the committee report in detail and
agreed that Judge Merhige had been done a great disservice. "Warner
made as effective and eloquent an argument as I have ever heard,"
recalls one committee member. "Hatch could not refute any of it. Sen-
ator Hatch would not agree to a retraction of his attacks upon Judge
Merhige, but he did mumble something about considering it further,
and that's the last we ever heard of the matter."'
Senator Hatch ultimately relented in the face of Senator Warner's
advocacy and in light of the growing support for Judge Merhige. In
addition to the report of the Richmond Bar Association committee, the
Young Lawyers' Section of the American Bar Association and the
Richmond chapter of the Federal Bar Association examined the allega-
tions and eventually cleared the judge." The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers not only supported Judge Merhige but went
on to recommend disciplinary action against the prosecutors who made
the charges.58 The North Carolina state bar then moved to censure the
prosecutors for violations of a state rule which provides that "a lawyer
shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge."' 9 A
Greensboro attorney expressed the bar's concern succinctly: "Judge
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Interview with Lewis T. Booker, supra note 32.
57. Richmond Newsleader, Dec. 24, 1979, at 2, col. 3. The ABA model suggests that bar
officials "[c]oordinate state and local bar association programs to broaden the base of the re-
sponse. In some cases, it may be appropriate for both the state bar and the local bar to respond. In
other cases, only one or the other should respond." UNJusT CRITIcis., supra note 1. at 2.
58. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 1, 1980, § B, at 4, col. 4.
59. Richmond Newsleader, Dec. 24, 1979, at 15, col. 6.
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Merhige is held in very high esteem in this area. No one has ever heard
even the slightest attack on him. And they don't like this attack."'
Trial attorneys from across the country came forward to add their
support and to express a consensus that Judge Merhige "enjoys a na-
tional reputation that is beyond reproach." 1 Finally, the United States
Department of Justice apologized to the judge and disciplined the pros-
ecutors who had filed the charges.62 As the Richmond Times-Dispatch
noted, "United States District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. may be
one of the most defended judges ever to be attacked. '63 The newspaper
recounted the many defenders of Merhige and noted that such investi-
gations of judicial conduct, "while rare in most cases, are becoming
commonplace for Merhige. 6 4
POSTSCRIPT
As the public furor over the Bagley trial receded, Judge Merhige
appeared at a luncheon .meeting of the Richmond Bar Association. The
audience gave him a standing ovation, then repeated the ovation for the
three bar committee members who had investigated the charges against
the judge. A speaker at the luncheon praised the committee's work and
pointed out that the members of the committee were three of the ablest
and highest-paid lawyers in Virginia. The speaker concluded his praise
by noting that "if this Bar Association were to be sent a bill for the
services rendered [by the committee], $100,000 would be the mini-
mum." Judge Merhige was moved by the show of support and told the
audience, "I've already expressed to the committee my deep, sincere
appreciation. But you're sure not going to get the $100,000, I can tell
you that. . . .I don't want to belittle the report, but I didn't think it
was that good." '65
Aside from such humorous remarks, Judge Merhige has never
publicly responded to the attacks on his handling of the Bagley trial.
Privately, he acknowledges his gratitude for the bar's efforts to clear
his name in public. "Under our system," he explains, "a judge is pow-
erless to respond to political attacks, and I am thankful that the Bar is
60. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 23, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 4, at 2, col. 5.
61. Id., § A, at 2, col. 4.
62. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 24, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 1.
63. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 23, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 4.
64. Id., § A, at 2, col. 3.
65. Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 21, 1980, § B, at 7, cols. 4, 8.
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willing to assume the burden on behalf of a judge."68
The Richmond Bar Association's defense of Judge Merhige pre-
dates, but complies with, significant aspects of the procedures sug-
gested in the ABA's Model Program for dealing with unjust criticism
of judges. The specific procedures utilized in defense of Judge Merhige
supplement the model program by demonstrating the type of exhaus-
tive public examination of charges that a bar association may choose to
undertake. This particular case also discloses an aspect of such investi-
gations that is not addressed by the ABA's model program - the bar's
decision to enter into private negotiations with a powerful political fig-
ure who initiated the public criticism. It may be that the ABA's model
program should be amended to include this possible avenue of redress,
or it may be adequate to simply cite this case history as precedent to be
followed in appropriate situations.
66. Merhige Interviews, supra note 16.
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